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Despite the relevance of corruption in project selection, planning and delivery, the project management literature pays little attention to this
crucial phenomenon. This paper sets the background to foster the discussion concerning how to select, plan and deliver infrastructure in corrupt
project contexts. It presents the different types of corruptions and the characteristics of projects that are more likely to suffer from it. Corruption is
particularly relevant for large and uncommon projects where the public sector acts as client/owner or even as the main contractor. Megaprojects are
“large unique projects” where public actors play a key role and are very likely to be affected by corruption. Corruption worsens both cost and time
performance, and the beneﬁts delivered. This paper leverages the institutional theory to introduce the concept of “corrupt project context” and,
using the case study of the Italian high-speed railways, shows the impact of a corrupt context on megaprojects.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Corruption is one of the key issues for public policies. It is
one of the major impediments to the development of emerging
countries and to further improve the quality of life in developed
countries (Loosemore and Lim, 2015; Tabish and Jha, 2011;
Treisman, 2007). The eradication of corruption is one of the
key challenges that the world faces. Scholars, e.g. (Akbar and
Vujić 2014; Auti and Skitmore 2008), agree that corruption
might be eradicated by enhancing education and with cultural
changes leading to a better government capable of producing
policies tackling this issue. According to (Rose-Ackerman,
1996), government policies can reduce corruption “increasing
the benefits of being honest, increasing the probability of
detection and punishment, and increasing the penalties levied⁎ Corresponding author.
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0263-7863/00/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open acc
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).on those caught […] Such measures usually require substantive
law reform and the introduction of more transparency (p. 47)”.
(Tabish and Jha, 2012) show a positive correlation between
“corruption free indicators” and professional standard, trans-
parency, fairness of punishment, procedural compliance and
contractual compliance. (Vee and Skitmore, 2003) extend the
view and show that ethical behaviours in the construction
industry are promoted by ethical guidelines and policies of
private organizations and professional bodies together with the
leadership of public sector procurement agencies. More
recently, (Kenny, 2012) indicates transparency in public
procurement as a key practice for fighting corruption.
Unfortunately, achieving all these essential processes and
cultural changes might take decades, while projects need to be
constantly planned and delivered. Therefore, while the sociolog-
ical and political communities cope with the long-term issues,
such as the cultural and policy changes, the project management
community should face the issue of corruption in projects without
further hesitation.ess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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such as complexity or “technological sublime”, weakness in
organizational design and capabilities, optimism bias, strategic
misinterpretation or even certain project characteristics, etc.
(Garemo et al., 2015; Locatelli et al., 2014). Corruption should
be one of these factors, but surprisingly it is not considered in
the project management literature. According to an enquiry on
Scopus in May 2016, only three papers published in leading
project management journals1 (i.e. the International Journal of
Project Management, the International Journal of Project
Organization and Management and the Project Management
Journal) have the word “corruption” in either the article title,
abstract or keywords. These papers are:
• (Sonuga et al., 2002) that indicates corruption, inadequate
sources of funding and price variation as major factors that
lead projects to failure in Nigeria.
• (Ling et al., 2014) that undertakes a comparative analysis of
drivers and barriers to adopt relational contracting practices
in public construction projects in two different markets:
Sydney and Beijing. The authors underline that this type of
contract may lead to allegations of corruption.
• (Bowen et al., 2015) that analyses the impact of corruption
on the South African construction industry.
In project management, corruption is the “elephant in the
room” that needs to be acknowledged and discussed. This paper
summarizes the key aspects known from the wide literature
concerning such “elephant”, shows the relevance of this topic in
project management and suggests a research agenda.
As explained later, corruption is particularly relevant for
megaprojects because of their intrinsic characteristics. Mega-
projects are projects characterized by: large investment
commitment, vast complexity (especially in organizational
terms), and long-lasting impact on the economy, the environ-
ment, and society (Brookes and Locatelli, 2015). Megaprojects
and their contexts are mutually interdependent since they
influence each other (Miller and Lessard, 2000). According to
(Kenny, 2006) “the major impact of corruption in infrastructure
is usually going to be on what is built where, not how much is
paid to build or connect it (p.18)”. Therefore, the investigation
of corruption in projects and megaprojects needs to consider the
mutual interlink with the project context, which is usually, and
prevalently, dominated by public policy and by public
procurement framework. The concept of “corrupt project
context”, as introduced by this research, is functional to this
investigation.
The topic of corruption is highly controversial. Furthermore, the
definition of a corrupt project context is particularly challenging
and to some extent contradictory; this happens because, in legal
terms, the concept of corruption applies to physical persons as a
matter of penal liability. However, pragmatically, it is necessary to
attribute the concept of corruption to complex socio-economic1 Other journals published papers about “corruption in projects”. This
sentence stresses how this topic is under-researched and under-published.
Relevant contributions from other journals are quoted in this paper.systems (e.g. organization, country, etc.). Therefore, this research
defines a corrupt project context as an environment where the
phenomenon of corruption is endemic.
To introduce the concept of “corrupt project context”, this
research leverages the institutional theory, which provides a
flexible and adaptive way of conceptualize institutions. Accord-
ing to (Henisz et al., 2012; Scott, 2005), institutions can be
conceptualized adopting three main perspectives: regulative,
normative and cultural-cognitive. These perspectives permit to
identify shared rules, norms, values, beliefs and understandings
that characterize institutions.
From one side, institutional theory enables to identify the
project context (Müller et al., 2015; Scott, 2012; Winch, 2000a).
To the other one, it permits to investigate corruption as a social/
institutional phenomenon rather than an individual crime (Hauser
and Hogenacker, 2014; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Uberti, 2016;
Williams et al., 2015). For pragmatic reasons, this research
assumes that the country-level institutionalizes corruption as a
social phenomenon; this is justified due to a sufficient stability
and uniformity of rules, cultural values, and shared beliefs. The
consideration of the country-level is consistent with (Jensen and
Jr., 2000) and it is also valid for the project context; similar
researches confirmed the tendency to consider the country as a
reliable institutional context. For instance, a description of the
project context of Germany and Great Britain is provided by
respectively (Bremer and Kok, 2000) and (Winch, 2000b). The
Italian case, with all its scandals and the endemic corruption, is
presented in (Bologna and Del Nord, 2000) and further detailed
later in the paper.
As a result, the overlap of these two institutional levels (i.e.
project context and corruption as a social phenomenon) originates
the concept of “corrupt project context”. This conceptualization
implies a major challenge to assess and quantify the extent to
which a socio-economic system is endemically corrupt. This
challenge lies in the ability to demonstrate and quantify the actual
presence of corruption.
Since often corruption cannot be directly assessed, this paper
considers (through a case study) two drivers of the perception of
corruption specifically in the project context, i.e. the Indexes
of Corruption (Section 4.1) and the Historical Perspective
(Section 4.2). Therefore, the paper focuses on public corruption,
particularly about public policy and public megaprojects. In
doing so, it paves the way to this research stream in the project
management by providing a relevant and updated background. In
particular, the paper focuses on two research questions:• RQ1: Which project characteristics favour corruption?
This first question is necessary to understand if there are
attributes that make the projects more likely to suffer from
corruption. The answer to this question is crucial, particularly for
decision-makers and policy-makers in corrupt countries. For
example, let us assume a “functional objective” (e.g. provide a
certain amount of electricity in a certain area) that can be satisfied
by two different projects, type and A and B, and one of these
(e.g. B) is more likely to attract corruption. Then, according to
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context.
• RQ2: How does a corrupt context affect project performance?
Since projects might have poor schedule and budget
performance even in “non-corrupt countries” this question
aims to highlight the impact of corruption by comparing similar
projects in different countries.
This paper leverages secondary data, mostly outside the
project management literature. Section 2 introduces the method-
ology, Section 3 summarizes the most salient literature about
corruption in projects, Section 4 presents an original contribution
about the Italian high-speed system, Section 5 discusses the
findings against the available literature, and Section 6 summa-
rizes the key contributions providing a research agenda.
2. Methodology
This research methodology is designed to answer the two RQs
previously presented. RQ1 is answered with a critical literature
review (Section 3) of sources mostly outside the project
management domain. RQ2 is addressed by the literature review
and further investigated with the Italian case study in Section 4.
Firstly, the literature review enables to formalize the key constructs
useful for this research: corruption, project context, corrupt project
context, megaproject, etc. Secondly, it permits to answer the RQ1
with a list of key drivers describing the typologies of projects that
are more likely to involve corruption. Thirdly, it introduces the
effect that projects involving corruption have on their performance,
during their lifecycle. In summary, the literature review highlights
two main aspects: the drivers of corruption, and the effect that
corruption has on project performance.
A case study regarding a megaproject in a “highly corrupt
context” integrates the literature review. The case study aims to
shed light on the role of the context on project performance. In
fact, if on the one hand corruption is often particularly presentProject
Corrupt project
context
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Phenomena of 
corruption
Project context
AND
RQ1
Fig. 1. Researchin megaprojects, on the other hand megaprojects are often
associated with poor performance even in countries with low
signals of corruption. Therefore, the methodology compares
megaprojects involved in the high-speed rail programmes in
Europe and globally (Section 5). The comparison considers
two main perspectives; firstly, the project contexts and the
extent to which it is corrupt. Secondly, the megaprojects
performance, normalized and adjusted to consider different
environmental, urbanistic and technological circumstances.
The comparison is developed around the case study of the
Italian high-speed rail programme. This case is used as a
reference because it is delivered in a corrupt project context
and is technologically comparable to the other European
high-speed rail programmes. The case study is designed to
highlight the relationship between the endemic phenomenon of
corruption and lower project performance; this approach is
implemented according to the principles stated by (Yin 2013;
Brookes et al. 2015). The case study is made up of three main
perspectives: the project context, the longitudinal view over
the project lifecycle and the transversal view about the project
performance. The case study is designed in such way for
pragmatic reasons because (1) it is difficult to demonstrate
directly the presence of corruption in projects and (2) the focus
of the research is not on single corruption episodes, but on the
project delivered in a “corrupt project context”. Therefore, the
paper indirectly shows the presence of corruption, by referring
to the project context and by showing the results of the judicial
processes and the investigations associated with the project.
Fig. 1 summarizes the key research constructs and their casual
interlinks along with the two RQs.
In particular, by adopting the research framework from
(Merrow, 2011), this paper shows how the project and project
management performance evolves over the project lifecycle.
The Merrow's framework evaluates the megaproject perfor-
mance through five parameters. Each parameter is associated
with the threshold value, which permits to judge whether the
performance is satisfactory or not (Table 1).Overbudget
Late
More costly and 
lengthy than 
analogous projects 
delivered in less 
corrupt contexts
Worse Cost/benefit 
analysis respect to 
forecast
Worse Cost/benefit 
analysis respect to 
analogous project 
delivered in less 
corrupt contexts
Performance 
during the 
project delivery
Performance 
related to the 
infrastructure 
(whole lifecycle)
RQ2
RQ2
Literature
Literature
framework.
Table 1
parameters and threshold for megaprojects evaluation (Merrow, 2011). The data
about schedules competitiveness are not analysed because the different length
of sections makes the evaluation too uneven.
Category Parameter Threshold
Cost Cost overruns N25%
Time Slip in execution schedules N25%
Quality Production versus plan Reduced production into year 2
Cost Cost competitiveness N25%
Time Schedule competitiveness N50%
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3.1. Introducing corruption
Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain”. (Transparency International,
2015a). According to (Aidt, 2003), there are three conditions
favouring corruption:
1) Discretionary power: public officials must have the power of
design or administer regulations and policies in a discre-
tionary manner (Ling and Tran, 2012)
2) Economic rents: the manipulation of decisions must derive
some return for the decision-makers.
3) Weak institutions: the structure of government institutions
and the political processes are very important determinants
of the level of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
Corruption is usually divided into two categories
(Transparency International, 2015a): “petty corruption” refers to
everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public
officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens; “grand
corruption” refers to acts of corruption committed by relevant
institutions such as governments and courts. A sub-category
called “political corruption” refers to the manipulation of policies,
institutions and procedural rules in the allocation of finances, or
other resources, perpetrated by policy-makers.
The Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre, 2015) classifies corruption according to the
frequency of the phenomenon: “sporadic corruption” is linked
to occasional opportunity; “systemic corruption” is an integrat-
ed and essential aspect of the economic, social and political
systems. The Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre
(GIACC, 2008) describes 47 possible acts of corruption that
may occur during the realization of an infrastructure. These acts
are divided into three phases: pre-qualification & tender,
project execution, and dispute resolution. Corruption may
occur in several ways, the most common are (Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre, 2015; GIACC, 2014).
• Bribery, which is committed when a person either offers/
gives some benefits to another person, or incentives to act
dishonestly. A bribe is not necessary a cash transaction, but
can involve a variety of non-cash advantages for the rogue,
for example services like free holidays, low tenancy fees in
prestigious accommodations, etc.• Extortion: describes the crime of obtaining money or some
other valuables by the abuse of office or authority.
• Fraud: involves rogue deceiving innocent party to gain some
financial or non-financial advantage.
• Abuse of power: occurs when a person in public office
deliberately acts in a way that is contrary to his/her duty and
is in breach of his position of public trust.
• Embezzlement: refer to the misappropriation of property or
funds legally entrusted to someone in their formal position
as an agent or guardian.
• Conflict of interests: occurs when an individual with a
formal responsibility to serve the public participates in an
activity that jeopardizes his or her professional judgement,
objectivity and independence.
• Nepotism: happens when the decisionmakers grant favouritisms
to their relatives.
These ways of corruption are fairly similar worldwide. For
instance, in the case of the case of South African construction
industry, ethical issues include: collusion, bribery, negligence,
fraud, dishonesty and unfair practices (Bowen et al., 2007).
3.2. The role of corruption on economic growth
3.2.1. Historical positive–negative dilemma on corruption
Sometimes, it is possible to hear unofficial conversations of
practitioners and policy makers about the theory of “efficient
corruption”. Historically, even scholars have been debating about
the existence of this peculiar concept. According to the supporters
of this theory, corruption may play a role as “grease on wheel” on
economic growth, especially where public institutions are weak.
(Leff, 1964) is one of the first authors to support the efficient
corruption theory. He tries to overcome the criticism based on
moral grounds and he defines corruption as “an extra-legal
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over
the action of the bureaucracy (p. 389)”. (Leff, 1964) shows that
corruption may have a positive impact on economic growth
because:
• It can make the bureaucrats work harder because bribes
motivate them.
• It could avoid the “red tape”, i.e. the excessive bureaucracy
or adherence to rules and formalities, especially in public
business. Hence, the bribe acts as “speed money”, or rather it
speeds up the bureaucracy.
• It can act as a “helping hand” to attract foreign direct
investments.
• It can introduce an element of competition in situations of
close markets (e.g. natural monopolies). It introduces a sort
of competitive bidding among the entrepreneurs where those
who can perform the work more efficiently, are also willing
to pay the highest bribe.
Subsequent studies have tried to confirm the existence of the
“efficient corruption”. (Lui, 1985) proposes a model where
customers can decide to pay bribes for buying better positions
in a bureaucratic queue, for example to obtain a licence. This
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time, is willing to pay the greatest bribe. The author identifies a
Nash equilibrium that minimizes the average value of the cost
of time in the queue and maximizes the revenue (in the form of
bribes) for the decision-makers. (Beck and Maher, 1986)
compare an equilibrium model of bribery to a competitive
bidding model. They explain that the same firm will win the
contract in both cases. Where the public policies are weak
corruption could be efficient (Lien, 1988). (Egger and Winner,
2005) investigate the role of corruption as a “helping hand” for
foreign direct investment. This work identifies as negative
effects of corruption: payment of bribes, resource wasting in
rent-seeking activities, additional contract risk. While as
positive effects of corruption it identifies the following: speed
up of bureaucratic processes, the possibility to access to the
publicly funded project.
Other scholars have raised sharp criticism against these studies
because they do not consider fundamental aspects in judging the
effects of corruption. These studies contend that corruption needs
secrecy that makes it distortionary, unmanageable and costly
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Corrupt public officials may
deliberately amplify the delay of the bureaucratic system to
extort more bribes. The consequence is that countries where
corruption and bribery prosper are, on average, also those in
which the firms in the country waste more (not less!) time with
government officials haggling over regulations (Kaufmann and
Wei, 1999). Lastly, history shows that when the corruption
system is centralized and well organized the effects on country‘s
economy are extremely harmful (Wedeman 1997).
3.2.2. Harmful effect of corruption
(Mauro, 1995) analyzes a dataset consisting of indices of
corruption, red tape, and efficiency of the judicial system. He
finds that corruption is negatively correlated with the in-
vestment rate, which in turn is associated with economic
growth. (Mauro, 1998) underlines that corruption leads to
spending more on those components of public expenditure on
which it may be easier or much more lucrative to levy bribes.
Consequently, corruption reduces the share of spending on
education, one of the major drivers for economic growth. This
is a vicious circle since the low level of expenditure on
education might cause further corruption (Mauro, 1998). (Mo,
2001) asserts that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces
the growth rate by about 0.72%. Since the money paid for
corruption might reduce the profit the construction company
might be keen to recover part of the profit by subcontracting at
the lowest cost, losing out on quality and value for money (May
et al., 2001). (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998) focus on qualitative
effects and show how corruption:
• Reduces public revenue and increases spending, contribut-
ing to the fiscal deficit.
• Increases income inequality because it allows well-positioned
individuals to take advantage of government activities at the
cost of the rest of population.
• Imposes regulatory controls and inspections for market
failures.• Distorts incentives.
• Acts as an arbitrary tax.
• Reduces the role of government in the enforcement of
contracts and on the protection of property rights.
• Reduces the legitimacy of the market economy and a
democracy.
• Acts as a barrier to entry in the market for small size and
emerging firms.
(Lambsdorff, 2003) analyses the relation between corruption
and productivity showing that an increase of corruption by one
point on a scale of from 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean)
lowers productivity by 2%. (Wei, 2000) studies the effects of
corruption on foreign direct investment demonstrating that
corruption negatively affects the ability to attract foreign direct
investment. (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998) study the casual link
between corruption in projects vs. quality and cost of
infrastructure. According to them, corruption is correlated
with (i) higher public investment, (ii) lower government
revenue, (iii) lower expenditures on operation maintenance,
(iv) lower quality of public infrastructure. Furthermore,
corruption reduces growth by (i) higher public investment
while reducing its productivity, (ii) lower quality of existent
infrastructure, (iii) lower government revenues needed to
finance productive spending.
3.3. Corruption in projects
3.3.1. Key drivers for corruptions in projects and megaprojects
The Bribe Payment Index by Transparency International
presents the likelihood of bribery in 19 different business sectors.
(Transparency International, 2011) indicates that bribery is
perceived to be common across all sectors: no sector scores
above 7.1 (on a 10 point scale, where 10 means very low chances
of paying), but the worst one, by far, is “public works contracts
and construction” with a score of 5.3. Furthermore, firms
operating in public works and construction sector not paying
bribes are those with more chances to lose business and see
corruption as a deterrent for projects otherwise attractive (Graf
Lambsdorff et al., 2004). Not all projects are the same, specific
features characterize projects and make it more or less susceptible
to corruption (Stansbury, 2005). These characteristics are:
• Size: this is the most important feature because it is easier to
hide bribes and inflated claims in large projects than in small
projects.
• Uniqueness: this makes budget costs difficult to compare
and therefore it is easier to inflate.
• Government involvement: public administrators can use
their arbitrary power especially where there are insufficient
controls on how government officials behave.
• Number of contractual links: each contractual link provides
an opportunity for someone to pay a bribe in exchange for
the contract award.
• Project complexity: when projects are very complex, factors
like mismanagement or poor design can hide bribes and
inflate claims.
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be critical to the survival or profitability of contractors,
which provides an incentive for contractors to use bribes.
• Work is concealed: subsequent processes cover the basic
components of the work. The quality of the components can
be very costly or difficult to check.
• Culture of secrecy: even if public funds subsidize the
projects, costs could be kept secret.
• Entrenched national interests: the government selects local
and national companies justifying the choice to favour
national interests. These positions have often been cemented
by bribery.
• Lack of ‘due diligence’: frequent lack of due diligence on
participants in construction projects allows corruption to
continue.
• The cost of integrity: in several cultures bribery and
deceptive practises are often accepted as the norm: not
paying these bribes means not doing the project.
(Zarkada-Fraser and Skitmore, 2000) show that stakeholders
more susceptible to corruption are younger, not affiliated to
professional bodies and less loyal to their organization, with
generally lower levels of job satisfaction. (Tang et al., 2012)
analyse the role of corruption to win contracts on the
international market. In particular the procurement is critical,
since corruption can be associated with (Søreide, 2002):
• Invitation: the public officials may have the power to decide
which enterprises to invite to the tender.
• Short listing/pre-qualification: limiting the number of com-
petitors according to previous experience.
• Technology choice: aiming to require particular character-
istics for the tender.
• Confidentiality of information: there are numerous ways for
public officials holding confidential information to misuse
their position.
• Deviation from the public competitive procurement process:
for example in case of emergency
The “megaproject” is a particular class of projects that shares
most of the aforementioned characteristics. Megaprojects are
very large investment projects that tend to be massive,
indivisible, and long-term artefacts, with investments taking
place in waves. Megaproject “effects are felt over many years,
especially as auxiliary and complementary additions are made”
(Miller and Lessard, 2000). Public policy strongly affects the
performance of public megaprojects. In fact, megaprojects
“remain under political scrutiny well after the official final
decision is made. Decisions made early on can have disastrous
effects when abstract political ambitions crystalize in specific
technical challenges (p. 782)” (Giezen, 2012). Despite their
fundamental economic and social role, megaprojects are often
implemented after a weak (or however not optimal) phase of
project planning, which leads such megaprojects to failure.
Indeed, (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) show that public infrastructure
megaprojects are affected by cost overrun, delays in differentphases of the project development, and their operating results
do not justify the implementation of the project.
3.3.2. Impact of corruption on project performance
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998) are among the firsts to in-
vestigate the link between corruption and poor quality of the
scope delivered. (Gillanders, 2014) shows that regions with
higher corruption than the national average tend to have worse
infrastructure than others. (Van de Graaf and Sovacool, 2014)
demonstrate that corruption can be a source of project failure,
especially in highly corrupt countries. (Ma and Xu, 2009)
identify two major acts of corruption:
1. To obtain unlawful the qualifications during bidders and/or
tender;
2. To raise prices or reduce the quality of engineering standards
during construction.
Therefore, corruption causes at least two major effects,
market distortion and worse cost/benefit. Regarding market
distortion, decision makers may prefer to situate projects in
locations under the physical control of particular corrupt
officials with the aim to enforce corruption (Kenny et al.,
2011). Furthermore, decision makers may push for the use of
complex technologies that require non-standard procurement
(see the case of TAV in 4.4). (Flyvbjerg and Molloy, 2011)
show how costs, time and benefits forecasts are deliberately and
systematically overoptimistic to promote a project at the
expense of another. In exchange, politicians might obtain
either bribes, support to their election campaigns, or both.
Therefore, corruption affects projects and megaprojects perfor-
mance leading to the delivery of works with limited social
benefit, poor economic returns and over-cost (Wells, 2014),
and building poor quality infrastructure in the wrong place.
Corruption affects the quality of the project starting from the
project preparation and it continues during its implementation
with major acts of corruption (Wells, 2014).
In summary, corruption negatively affects project perfor-
mance because:
• It delays delivery times and increases infrastructure costs.
• It reduces the potential economy of infrastructure because
sub-optimal projects are implemented.
• It reduces efficiency, favouring construction firms with
corrupt connections rather than the most efficient ones.
• It reduces the quality of infrastructure services.
• It increases the operating cost of providing a given level of
infrastructure services. It limits access, especially for the
poor, because of the higher price of service associated with
higher costs in construction, operation and maintenance.
• It favours the creation of monopolies and market
concentrations.
4. Context and project selection
This section provides the rationale for selecting Italy as project
context and TAV (“Treno adAlta velocità”, i.e. “High-speed train”)
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Subsection 4.1, Italy seems one of the most corrupt European
countries with key concerns in “anti-corruption agency” and
“Public Sector”. Several infrastructure projects have been delivered
in Italy and most of them were reported as affected by corruption.
The availability of public information about judicial proceedings
and projects characteristics in Italy allow studying the role played
by corruption in megaprojects Among the others, megaprojects
delivered in Italy, the research focuses on TAV. Indeed, TAV is the
largest infrastructure investment programme in Italy over the past
20 years and evidence of corruptions have emerged. Therefore,
consistently with the framework in Section 2, the study of planning
and delivery of TAV in Italy is an exemplary case of
megaproject(s) delivered in a corrupt project context.4.1. European and Italian indexes of corruptions
The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived
levels of public sector corruption in 175 countries (Transparency
International, 2014). In the last report (2014), Italy was 69th
worldwide with a score of 43/100 (where 100 indicates a very
low perception of corruption) and was the worst in the European
Union (EU-15 and EU-282). Fig. 2 shows that in the last ten years
the Italian level of Corruption Perceptions Index has not
undergone improvement and recently Italy became the most
corrupt country in the EU. The Control Corruption Index (Fig. 3)
measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain and the strength and effectiveness of a country's policy and
institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption (World
Bank, 2013). In the last survey (2014), Italy occupied the 94th
position out of 209 nations (one of the worst in the EU).2 The term EU-15 refers to states that joined the EU within 2004 i.e.: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
EU-28 refers to all current Member States of the EU, so it includes the
aforementioned EU-15 States plus Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.The lack of effective national anti-corruption efforts in Italy is
also underlined by another Index developed by Transparency
International, the National Integrity System. The index evaluates
the key pillars in a country's governance system, both regarding
their internal corruption risks and their contribution to fighting
corruption in society, on a scale from 0 to 100. The average
National Integrity System for Italy is 57.25, a quite poor value
(Transparency International, 2015b). According to this index
the three weakest pillars in Italy are ‘media’ (score 38),
‘anti-corruption Agency’ (38) and ‘Public Sector’ (42), whilst
the strongest pillars are ‘Supreme Audit Institution’ (79),
‘Judiciary’ (75) and ‘Electoral Management Body’ (75). The
comparison of the principal pillars (Politics, Society, Culture and
Economy) with EU-15 (Fig. 4) shows that Italy is far from
European excellence, and well beneath the average of EU-15
especially in Politics and Culture. (Transparency International,
2013) affirms that in Italy it is easy to circumvent mechanisms put
in place to protect integrity by taking advantage of complex
regulations, difficult access to information, and poor evaluation
systems.
Another index related to corruption is the “Dealing with
Construction Permits”, developed by the World Bank. This
index measures practices in construction regulation and
assesses the quality control and safety mechanisms in place
for the construction permitting system. As explained in (Kenny
et al., 2011), more “red tape” is associated with higher
corruption, thus a poor result in this index might be a sign of
corruption. In the last survey (2014), Italy was 116 out of 189
countries with a score of 67.35 (on a scale from 0 to 100, where
100 indicates no problems with permits) and also in this case it
is one of the worst countries in the EU. Finally, the Ethics and
Corruption index, developed by the World Economic Forum,
also shows Italy as one of the countries with more corruption.
In the last survey (2015), Italy scored 2.8 on a scale from 0 to 7
(best), and it occupies the 102nd position out of 144 countries
worldwide and the second to last position among the EU
countries (World Economic Forum, 2015). In summary, all
these indicators highlight Italy as one of the most corrupt
countries in the EU, and one of the most corrupt among the
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Fig. 3. Control of Corruption Index in the EU and Italy. The 2014 Italian score was −0.11 in a scale from −2.5 to 2.5, where higher values correspond to less
corruption. Elaboration from (World Bank, 2013).
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issue of the “corrupt project context”.4.2. Evidence of corruption in TAV
This subsection highlights the signals of corruption occurred
during the planning and delivery of the megaprojects related to
the TAV programme. In doing so, it presents the major
investigations related to corruption in the planning and delivery
of TAV. Keeping in mind the idea of “corrupt project context”
there are four important premises:1. The purpose of the following analysis is not to reconstruct in
detail the trials for corruption involved in the TAV
megaprojects, but to highlight that several prosecution
offices throughout Italy investigated the corruption in the
TAV megaprojects.
2. Due to its nature, corruption is secret and stakeholders usually
do not have an advantage in denouncing corruption acts, so
corruption is very difficult to detect even for investigators.
3. All investigations for “petty corruption” are omitted because
of the difficulty of finding official information, especially
concerning the initial phase of the megaprojects.Fig. 4. National Integrity System principal pillars. Elaboration from (Transparency
International, 2015b). Data from Austria, Croatia, Cipro, Ireland, Luxemburg and
Malta not available.4. Formally, the TAV was private up to 2006, and in Italy the
crime of corruption between private entities at the time did
not exist.
Fig. 5 includes the timeline with a selection of major events
linked to corruption in TAV divided into three categories:
inquiries, arrests and judicial acts. Table 2 summarizes the major
inquiries for corruption in megaprojects and their outcome.
4.3. A corrupt project context: Italy
The concept of “corrupt project context” is derived from the
institutional theory, which considers the regulative, normative
and cultural-cognitive perspectives (Henisz et al., 2012; Scott,
2005). The research focuses on these three perspectives at
country-level to identify evidence of corruption and therefore
determines the extent to which the project context is corrupt.
This section describes such evidence in Italy, which is the
project context for the TAV case study.
Remarkable cases of corruption characterized the history
of Italy since its unification (1861). The first scandals,
the “Manifattura Tabacchi” (1868, in English “Tobacco
Manufacturing”) and the “Banca Romana” scandal (1893, in
English “Roman Bank”) (Pezzella, 2011), occurred during the
monarchical period (1861–1946). During the First World War
and the following years, the reconstruction of the infrastructure
network demanded a substantial new financial commitment and
public works reached 50% - 60% of total state investments.
During the years of fascism, although road works have retained a
dominant place, the state has undertaken the realization of a major
national programme of drying up swamps and exploitation of
waters (Stanghellini, 2000). In this context corruption flourished
(Bosworth, 2000) and, during the 50s, corruption was widespread
especially in the local government. The “INGIC scandal” showed
that political parties, even of opposite factions, can collaborate to
promote corruption (Camera dei deputati, 1964). In the 70s many
corruption scandals involved large state-owned enterprises
(Almerighi, 1993). During the 80s, corruption further expanded
becoming systemic and widespread. In the early ‘90s the growing
corruption led to a set of inquiries, e.g. “Tangentopoli” or “Mani
Code Event Reference
I1 The prosecutor in Milan investigates bribes in TAV (Cicconi et al., 2015)
12 The prosecutor in Rome investigates the procedures for construction of the TAV (Cicconi et al., 2015)
13 Anti-Mafia parliamentary commission complaint about Camorra infiltration in TAV's procurement (Cicconi et al., 2015)
A1 The Prosecutor in La Spezia orders the arrest of managers of FS,politicians and entrepreneurs for corruption and other crimes related to corruption. (Corriere della sera, 1996)
I4 The prosecutor in Naples investigates entrepreneurs and politicians for corruption (Marino, 1996)
A2 The inquiry of La Spezia continues in Perugia where there are arrests of managers of Fs, politicians, entrepreneurs and judges (Milella, 1998)
I5 The prosecutor in Naples accuses business peopleand politicians of corruption (Repubblica, 1998)
I6 The prosecutor in Rome investigates entrepreneurs and politician for crimes linked to corruption (Mastrogiacomo, 1998)
J1 Inquiry of Perugia, the court of first instance convicts defendants (Biondani, 2000)
J2 Inquiry of Perugia, the court of second instance confirms the first judgment (J1)  (Corriere della sera, 2001)
J3 Inquiry of Perugia, the Court of Appeal cancels the first two sets of proceedings (J1;J2) (Vinci, 2003)
J4 The court of Nola convicts politicians and entrepreneurs for crimes related to corruption (Repubblica, 2003)
I7 The prosecutor in Genoa investigates managers, FS politicians and business people for corruption (Calandri, 2004)
J5 Inquiry of Genova, limitation of crimes (I7) (Meletti, 2011)
J6 Inquiry of Perugia, limitation of crimes (A2) (Corriere della sera, 2007)
A3 the prosecutor of Florence orders the arrest of politician and managers of FS (Repubblica, 2013)
I8 The prosecutor of Florence investigates politician, entrepreneurs and managers of FS for corruption and other crimes linked to corruption (32 people and 7
firms)
(Selvatici, 2015)
A4 The prosecutor of Florence orders new arrest of politician and managers FS (Il fatto quotidiano, 2015)
Fig. 5. Major events linked to corruption in TAV. Legend Codes: I = Inquiry, A = Arrest, J = Other Jurisdictional act. Elaboration from (Biondani, 2000; Calandri,
2004; Corriere della sera, 1996; Corriere della sera, 2001; Corriere della sera, 2007; Il fatto quotidiano, 2015; Marino, 1996; Mastrogiacomo, 1998; Meletti, 2011;
Milella, 1998; Repubblica, 1998; Repubblica, 2003; Repubblica, 2013; Selvatici, 2015; Vinci, 2003).
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of the three major Italian political parties caught with an
agreement to manage and distribute bribes (Bologna and Del
Nord, 2000). In 1993, the inquiry reached the highest point with
the discovery of the maxi-bribe Enimont/Montedison, reaching a
value of about €127 million in 2015 equivalent value. In that
case, 4520 people were investigated, and 1121 were sentenced.
The majority of them were quickly returned to public and
ordinary life, in part for the statute-barred of the crimes and in part
because the political sanctions imposed against politicians
involved in corruption scandals were quite mild (Sargiacomo et
al., 2015). Despite the scandal, the Italian legislators apparently
failed to prevent the problem of corruption. For instance, the
reform of the law about public work contracts about the Italian
building process following Tangentopoli (Bologna and Del Nord,
2000) had little effect. “After Tangentopoli the Italian legislation
has not implemented mechanisms to combat the problem of
corruption, but sometimes, has favoured its diffusion”. These
words come from Raffaele Cantone, the current President of
Italian National Anti-Corruption Authority (Il fatto quotidiano,Table 2
Major inquiries for corruption in TAV and their outcome. Elaboration from
reference in Fig. 5.
Prosecution office Defendants Outcome of Inquiry
Rome Unknown No further actions
Milan Unknown No further actions
La Spezia/Perugia Politician, managers
FS and entrepreneurs
Limitation of crimes
Naples/Nola Politician and entrepreneurs Convictions for crime
related to corruption
Rome Politician and entrepreneurs No further actions
Genova Politician, managers
FS and entrepreneurs
Limitation of crimes
Florence Politician, managers
FS and entrepreneurs
In progress2014). Thanks to the evidence provided by the judicial inquiries,
Italy is a model of the failure of ordinary institutional mechanisms
to control corruption in an advanced democracy (Vannucci,
2009). In recent years, corruption scandals have become even
more common for projects and megaprojects. Investigators have
discovered criminal associations sharing public contracts and the
vast majority of megaprojects performed in Italy (e.g. EXPO,
TAV, and MOSE) are under investigation. As also reflected by
the indicators later presented, after the period of Tangentopoli the
corruption remained rooted in the system andmuchmore difficult
to detect. For example, infrequently the scandals in the recent
years are characterized by “traditional cash bribes”. Conversely,
bribes are paid with, for example, with false consultancies jobs.
Table 3 summarizes the most relevant Italian projects. The
average cost increase is 179% for the whole sample, 216%
for railways and 103% for roads. These numbers are huge
compared to the average increase suggested by the literature
(see Section 5).
Also major events face corruption. Among the last major
events held in Italy (the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, the G8
meeting in 2009 scheduled in La Maddalena and then moved to
L'Aquila, the 2009 World Aquatics Championships in Rome
and EXPO 2015 in Milan) only the Winter Olympics games
were not involved in major corruption inquiries. In addition, the
structures built for these events (including the Winter Olympics
games) are very often abandoned at the end of the event, or
even worse never finished, which is a clear symptom of poor
planning.
4.4. A project delivered in a corrupt project context: TAV
4.4.1. TAV case study
TAV started in the 1991 with the announcement of the
construction of seven high-speed railways with new technical
standards allowing the trains to reach 300 km/h: Rome-Naples
Table 3
Cost overrun for Italian megaprojects during the period 2011–2014. *First cost
estimation from the first resolution of the Italian government “Interdepartmental
Committee for Economic Planning” (Prima stima costi all. 1 delibera CIPE
121/2001) Elaboration from (CGIA, 2014).
Type Project Name 2001 cost
(M€)*
2014 cost
(M€)
% cost
overrun
Rail Collegamento ferroviario Torino-Lione 1808 4564 152%
Sempione traforo ferroviario 1808 3005 66%
Asse ferroviario Monaco-Verona 2582 9223 257%
Corridoio 5 Lione-Kiev
(Torino-Trieste)
7902 30,280 283%
Accessibilità ferroviaria Malpensa 1133 4280 278%
Gronda Ferroviaria Merci Nord Torino 1291 4393 240%
Asse ferroviario Brennero-La Spezia 1511 2766 83%
Asse ferroviario Ventimiglia-Milano 4380 9102 108%
Asse ferroviario Salerno-Catania 12,292 41,149 235%
Asse ferroviario Bologna-Taranto 742 2299 210%
Asse ferroviario Milano-Firenze 1291 13,135 917%
Trasversale ferroviaria Orte-Falconara 1926 3719 93%
Sistema integrato di trasporto nodo
Napoli
3886 6624 70%
Road Accessibilità stradale Valtellina 481 2410 401%
Autostrada Cuneo-Nizza 837 3000 258%
Asse stradale pedemontano 3099 9336 201%
Passante di Mestre 2737 4487 64%
Asse autostradale Brennero-La Spezia 1033 4682 353%
Pontina-A12-Appia 1136 4937 335%
Asse autostradale Salerno-Reggio
Calabria
13,449 13,843 3%
Asse viario Fano-Grosseto 1854 5119 176%
Asse viario Marche Umbria 1808 2508 39%
Collegamento A1-A14. Termoli
S. Vittore
1549 3371 118%
Asse Nord-Sud Tirrenico-Adriatico 1738 4960 185%
Corridoio Jonico 3099 20,171 551%
Nodo stradale e autostradale di Genova 2765 4829 75%
TOTAL RAIL 42,552 134,539 216%
TOTAL ROAD 41,225 83,653 103%
TOTAL ALL THE PROJECTS 78,137 218,192 179%
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Genoa-Milan (GE-MI), Milan-Turin (MI-TO), Milan-Verona
(MI-VR) and Verona-Venice (VR-VE). These new lines were
also built to reduce the traffic on traditional lines allowing a better
management of freight and regional trains (Senato della
Repubblica, 2007). In 1998 the project expanded its scope:
from an AV system to an AV/AC system (High-Speed/
High-Capacity) to support freight trains (Senato della
Repubblica, 2007). Since 1997, these Italian projects were
integrated into a larger European programme called TEN-T
(European Commission, 2015). In 2001 five new lines were
proposed: Torino-Lyon (Italian part), Verona-Munich (Italian
part), Salerno-Catania, Naples-Bari and Venice-Trieste (Beria
and Grimaldi, 2011).
In 2015, after 24 years, only four of the original railways
were complete: RO-NA, FI-BO, BO-TO, TO-MI. The
sub-section Milan-Treviglio and Padua-Venice were built with
traditional standards and integrated with HS railways. The
railways GE-MI and MI-VR still have sections under
construction. The rest of the railways are still in the design
phase (RFI, 2015).The procurement of major infrastructure is always critical
for corruption, even “fixed criterion weights ensure objectivity
and reduce the risk of unfairness and corruption in the
evaluation of bidders' proposals, but only provided they
accurately reflect the relative importance of the evaluation
factors to the owner. However, it is still possible to create an
unfair evaluation system in which too much emphasis is placed
on particular evaluation factors, thus favouring (intentionally or
unintentionally) those bidders that score highly in the
corresponding factors” (Ballesteros-Pérez et al., 2015).
The procurement of the TAV megaprojects has been highly
controversial and to some extent unclear. (Cicconi et al., 2015)
highlights major dysfunctions in perpetrating the public
objectives, particularly in terms of transparency, market
freedom (i.e. selection of the contractor, of the technology,
etc.) and financial fairness. Fairness is intended e.g. as giving to
the Italian citizens a fair and acceptable financial condition in
relation to the public debt and giving to the contractors
(especially sub-contractors) a reasonable return and satisfaction
(Masrom et al., 2013).
According to the declaration of Mario Moretti (former CEO
of Trenitalia) during a parliamentary inquiry (Senato della
Repubblica, 2007), originally, the TAV was set up as a private
project. At the time of incorporation of the TAV SpA (1991) the
majority shareholders were private institutions, primarily finan-
cial institutions (Cicconi et al., 2015). This initial set up
permitted them to avoid the public procurement process, which
includes prescriptions concerning transparency, market freedom,
etc. The private procurement process permitted them to
pre-select the main contractors (of the various infrastructure
sections composing the TAV programme) and the infrastructure
technology without an open tendering process (Senato della
Repubblica, 2007). The contractual framework was issued
without a public safeguard according to the “freedom of
contracts” (Furmston et al., 2012) that is typical of private
bargains.
Afterwards, before the construction phase, the financial
institutions (i.e. the private parties) did not subscribe the capital
increase required to finance the delivery of the infrastructure.
Hence, in 1998 Ferrovie dello Stato (FS – “State Railways”)
acquired control of TAV SpA. The infrastructure has been
financed by the capital increase and by a private debt (about
40% of the whole capital cost) guaranteed by the State (Senato
della Repubblica, 2007). According to Mario Moretti, the TAV
programme suffered vast delays and cost overruns caused,
among other factors, by the choices made during the private
procurement process (Senato della Repubblica, 2007). The lack
of an open-ended procurement process leads to a selection of
expensive technical solutions (Senato della Repubblica, 2007).
In particular, the design of the high-speed network for both the
passengers and the freight trains appears questionable. Freight
trains have higher weights, increasing the cost of the whole
infrastructure for various reasons including limitation on slopes
and requirement of a larger power supply. This unconventional
technical choice is an Italian peculiarity. After almost 7 years
from the completion of the first high-speed railway in Italy no
freight trains use these lines (Cicconi et al., 2015).
Fig. 6. Cost overruns for TAV railways (currency actualized to 2015). The bar chart (scale on the left — billions of €) shows the absolute value of TAV cost trend
(constant currency). The triangles (scale on the right) is the % Cost overrun for TAV railways respect to the 25% threshold. Elaboration from (ANAC, 2007; Camera
dei deputati, 2015a, 2015b; Cicconi, 2011; Repubblica, 1994; Rossi, 2000).
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The project evaluation entails the comparison of cost
overruns, time overruns, benefit in the operation of Italian
TAV with similar projects developed in less corrupt countries.
4.4.2.1. Cost overruns. The cost analysis considers three
phases:
1) First forecast, i.e. the first forecast with the cost declared
during the launch of the project in 1991.
2) Second forecast, i.e. the cost determined by supplementary
contract, or rather the signature of the contract between the
General Contractors and FS.
3) Final cost, i.e. the final cost of the railway, or the last
estimate available for those still under construction.
Fig. 6 shows the cost overrun for each railway. Costs are
actualized to March 2015. As evident, all the projects are
dramatically overbudget and well above the 25% threshold of
(Merrow, 2011).
4.4.2.2. Slip in execution schedules. Fig. 7 shows the
difference between the time scheduled and real progress of
the railways RO-NA, FI-BO, and BO-TO, TO-MI, the only
projects completed. The work started with a considerable delayFig. 7. On the left, difference between time scheduled (grey cells) and real progress (
schedules overrun for TAV railways (right). Elaboration from (Repubblica, 1991)(RFI
2015).and the execution schedules are longer than expected. The
figure also shows the overrun in execution schedules.
4.4.2.3. Scope and operation. The scope is assessed by
comparing the number of trains travelling daily on high-speed
lines with respect to the maximum number of trains that the
line can support. The lines were built to manage the passage
of a train every 5 min (Ferrovie dello Stato, 2015) and in
particular the goal is the passage of 120 passenger trains and
40 freight trains per day for each direction (Cicconi et al., 2015).
Table 4 clearly shows how the TAV railways are dramatically
underused.
4.4.2.4. Cost competitiveness. The comparison between the
Italian high-speed project and other European high-speed
railways is challenging due to the differences concerning the
technological designs, i.e. the Italian technology is unconven-
tional compared to the other EU countries. However, the
following analysis compares the costs of the Italian railways
with the Spanish AVE (Alta Velocidad Española) and the French
TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse). Table 5 lists the railways used for
the analysis.
The relative average cost for the Spanish and the French
railways is € 18.01 million per km. To obtain the threshold of
failure this value should be increased by 25%, so the value ofblack cells) for completed railways (left). On the right, time overrun in execution
, 2015)(Oice, 2007)(Cirillo, 1994)(Repubblica, 2000)(Regione Emilia-Romagna,
Table 4
Number of trains for each HS railways and percentage of utilization respect to
the capacity of 240 trains per hour (Cicconi et al., 2015; Italo, 2015; Trenitalia,
2015).
Railways N° of trains
ITALO
N° of trains
FS
Total N°
of trains
% of
utilization
MI-TO 14 28 42 17,5%
BO-MI 18 78 96 40%
FI-BO 22 126 148 62%
RO-NA 16 62 78 32,5%
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Fig. 8. Cost/km comparison between Italian, French and Spanish HS railways
Cost/km comparison between Italian, French and Spanish HS railways.
Elaboration from (Fernández et al., 2012)(Recarte, 2013)(Ministry of Ecology,
2007)(Railway Gazette, 2010)(Railway Gazette, 2011).
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railways with the threshold of failure. Also in this case, all
Italian railways are above the threshold. During an inquiry of
the Senate, the management of FS justified the differences of
costs between Italian, French, and Spanish high-speed railways
with technical factors shown in Fig. 9. Even accepting the
factors and the maximums of the cost increases proposed by
FS (i.e. 23 M€/km), the cost of the Italian railways remains
higher than the Spanish and French railways. Remarkably, as
showed in Fig. 10 Spain and France were less corrupt than
Italy all over the programme life cycle. In conclusion, in the
parameter “cost competitiveness” the megaproject fails, also
considering planning and territorial differences with respect to
other projects.5. Discussion
5.1. Benchmark with international performance
Table 3 shows that the average overbudget of the 27 Italian
infrastructure projects is globally 179%. Table 6 compares the
overbudget of Italian infrastructure with analogous infrastruc-
ture delivered in other countries. It is clear that the overbudget
for the Italian infrastructure (including TAV) is much higher
than analogues infrastructure delivered in other countries. The
escalation is even higher than what observed in multi billions
unique infrastructure such as the Eurotunnel (increased by 59%
“alone” or 69% considering the related projects (Winch, 2013)).
Several arguments can explain the overbudget of infrastruc-
tures. (Cantarelli et al., 2010) summarizes the most important
ones emerged from Flyvbjerg’ studies (see key reference in
Table 6):Table 5
Spanish and French railways selected for the comparison. Costs are actualized to 20
(Fernández et al., 2012; Ministry of Ecology, 2007; Railway Gazette, 2010; Recarte
Country High-speed railway Length
(Km)
Opening
years
Spain Madrid-Barcelona 671 2008
Spain Madrid-Valladolid 155 2007
Spain Cordoba-Malaga 201 2007
France Valence- Marseilles 250 2001
France LGV-Est (1) 300 2007
France LGV-Est (2) 107 2016
France Tours-Bordeaux 279 2017
France Le Mans-Rennes 180 2017• Technical: forecasting errors including price rises, poor
project design, and incompleteness of estimations, scope
changes, uncertainty, Inappropriate organizational structure,
inadequate decision-making process, inadequate planning
process.
• Economical deliberate underestimation due to: lack of
incentives and resources, inefficient use of resources,
dedicated funding process, poor financing/contract manage-
ment, strategic behaviour.
• Psychological: Optimism bias among local officials, Cogni-
tive bias of people, Cautious attitudes towards risk.
• Political: Deliberate cost underestimation, Manipulation of
forecasts, Private information
Certainly optimism bias,— strategic misrepresentation (two
of Flyvbjerg and Cantarelli's central arguments) and, in case of
a programme, the escalation of commitment (Winch, 2013)
might account for a portion of the overbudget. However, not
only in Italy, but also in other countries such as France and
Spain (see 4.4.2) and arguably everywhere (Table 6) the
decision makers were subject to optimism bias, strategic
misrepresentation and other issues. Yet, their overbudget in
projects is in the region of 10%–50%. The cost performance of
Italian infrastructure is dramatically worse than elsewhere,
therefore there must be something more on top of the
aforementioned list of factor from (Cantarelli et al., 2010).
We argue that the high level of corruption is likely to play a
critical role during the selection, planning and delivery of
infrastructure projects.15 using conversion rate from http://rivaluta.istat.it/Rivaluta/. Elaboration from
, 2013; SNFC, 2015).
Cost
(B €)
Relative Cost
(M €/km)
Year cost Cost/km 2015
(M€)
8179 12,19 2010 13,07
2277 14,69 2010 15,75
3729 18,56 2010 19,89
4778 19,11 2009 20,76
4655 15,52 2009 16,85
2010 18,79 2009 20,40
7200 25,81 2010 26,92
3300 18,33 2011 19,12
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Technological innovation and newer safety rules
Land use issue and urbanization
Direct award to General Contractor
Environmental and landscape compatibility
Topography and seismicity of Italian land
mln €/km
Estimated increase (mln €/km) 
Fig. 9. Causes and estimating of the higher cost of Italian HS railways. Elaboration from (Senato della Repubblica, 2007).
264 G. Locatelli et al. / International Journal of Project Management 35 (2017) 252–268The overbudget value of Italian infrastructure is systemat-
ically higher with no relevant improvement over time. This
seems an example of “tolerance for deviation (Pinto, 2014)” i.e.
people within the organization become so much accustomed to
a deviant behaviour that they do not consider it as deviant any
more. Normalization of deviance suggests that the unexpected
becomes expected. Thus, a deviant culture such as the tolerance
of corruption becomes accepted and causes counterproductive
behaviours. In particular, politicians play the necessary
“political games” and maintain important contacts to ensure
broad-based support for the project despite the terrible project
management performances (Pinto and Patanakul, 2015). This is
a further conceptualisation of the temporary project/programme
organization proposed by (Winch, 2014) where the permanent
organizations are often participated by the Italian state. This
implies having the policy makers as salient stakeholders in
most of the key organizations all over the project and operation
phase. A long term view, embracing the stakeholders over the0
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Fig. 10. Comparison of indexes of corruption between Italy, France and Spain.
Elaboration from (Transparency International, 2014) top, (World Bank, 2013)
bottom.life cycle is fundamental for the appraisal of the “project
success” (Turner and Zolin, 2012).5.2. Answers to the research questions
This article explored the role of corruption in project
management and megaproject management, taking the lead
from two ambitious research questions.
The first research question aimed to understand which
project characteristics favour corruption. An in-depth analysis
of the literature allowed us to identify several characteristics
that increase the odds of a project to suffer corruption,
including project size, uniqueness, heavy involvement of the
government and technical and organizational complexity. We
observed that megaprojects match all these characteristics.
Furthermore, projects delivered in “corrupt countries” or
“corrupt project contexts” are more likely, ceteris paribus, to
suffer corruption than in less corrupt contexts. Project context
matters: discretionary power of officials, economic rents of
policy/decision makers and weak institutions make a country
ideal for corruption. In this case the investigation of the link
between projects and strategy become essential, and the
analysis must be carefully developed since the front end
(Pinto and Winch, 2016), that is the “critical phase” for most of
the megaprojects (Merrow, 2011).
The second research question investigated how corruption
affects project performance. In order to address this question,
the authors performed an in-depth analysis of the Italian
high-speed railway system. The choice allowed comparing the
Italian case with analogous European megaprojects, providing
an explorative but thorough answer to the research question.
Corruption is harmful for both project management success and
project success. During the project phase, the infrastructure
suffer extra-costs with respect to both their budget cost and to
other comparable infrastructure. Similarly, looking at the
schedule, there are remarkable delays. During the operation
phase, the infrastructure fail to deliver the expected benefit, e.g.
the high-speed Railway system in Italy is underused. Clearly,
the role of the Italian state as a “strong owner” (Winch and
Leiringer, 2016) is extremely problematic. This is further
developed in Section 5, where all these dimensions of project
evaluation listed in 4.4.2 have been analysed for the high-speed
railway Italian projects. More generally, corruption leads to a
Table 6
Summary of the literature about overbudget in the Road, Rail and Fixed Links (Bridge and Tunnel).
Reference Location Sector/Infrastructure Sample Size Overbudget
Table 3 of this paper Italy Rail 13 +216%
Road 13 +103%
Total 36 +179%
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2016) World Roads 863 +20%
Hong Kong's Roads 25 +11%/+6%/−1%
(Cantarelli and Flyvbjerg, 2015)
updating
(Flyvbjerg, 2008)
World Rail 58 +45%
Fixed link 33 +34%
Road 167 +20%
(Cantarelli and Flyvbjerg, 2015) Europe Rail 23 +34%
Fixed links 15 +43%
Road 143 +22%
Total 181 +26%
North America Rail 19 +41%
Fixed links 18 +26%
Road 24 +8%
Total 61 +24%
Other geographical areas Rail 16 +65%
(Cantarelli et al., 2012) Netherlands Road 37 +19%
Rail 26 +11%
Fixed links 15 +22%
(Lee, 2008) cited in (Cantarelli et al., 2012) South Korea Road 138 +11%
Rail 16 +48%
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allocation over several projects “from a strategic misrepresen-
tation perspective, the lie has to be repeated many times, and as
evidence of escalation accumulates, that lie has to be repeated
in the face of growing opposition from those who are providing
the financial resources.”(Winch, 2013 p.726).
6. Conclusions and further developments
There is plenty of literature about corruption. Unfortunate-
ly, most articles have not been published in project manage-
ment journals and, more importantly, are not focused on the
project management community. Despite the relevance of
corruption in public projects and megaprojects, it seems that is
not convenient to research, to talk and to write about it. In spite
of the amount of papers published on relatively close fields
(governance, stakeholders, risk, value), corruption seems a
taboo and project management scholars seem afraid to write
about it. However (and unfortunately), the context of the public
sector and procurement of large projects is ideal for corruption.
This paper adopts the institutional theory to introduce the
idea of “corrupt project context” to indicate the research needs
of a systemic view. A major contribution of this paper is
therefore to rethink the role of corruption in projects from a
social and institutional level. Projects are not delivered in a
vacuum environment, but a number of internal and external
stakeholders links them to the project context. At the same
time, the study of the project context alone is not fully
appropriate since different project characteristics may favour
or disfavour corruption. The investigation of successful
planning and delivery of megaprojects, which have most the
characteristics that can favour corruption, in a corrupt project
context is therefore a key challenge that practitioners and
academic will need to face in the next decades. If projectmanagement practitioners and academics aim to reduce
corruption is not enough to point out a “few rotten apples”
when an entire area or country suffers endemic corruption. It is
unrealistic and simplistic to say “don't deliver projects in that
location”, especially due to the urge for projects and
megaprojects in the next decades, such as power plants and
hospitals (just to name a few). So, there is a huge scope in the
project management sector to research how to deliver
successful projects in a corrupt project context. Maybe, in the
case of power plants, corruption has to be fought through the
delivery of several small standardized projects (with an
established cost/benefit track record), rather than in megaproj-
ects with unique characteristics and budgets difficult to
estimate.
The case-study approach used in this article has some
limitations, as it cannot quantitatively demonstrate exactly the
specific impact of a corrupt context on a project poor
performance. As discussed in the article, demonstrating such
relationship is remarkably difficult in that corruption is often
considered a phenomenon more associated to individuals than
to projects. Furthermore, megaprojects often have unique
characteristics and many influencing factors for their perfor-
mance. The article therefore provides a first tentative to
approach the problem, whereas further research will need to
identify the most appropriate methods to in-depth analyse the
phenomenon. If the debate is to be moved forward, a better
understanding of corruption from the project management
perspective needs to be developed.
Firstly, future research activities should deepen the
correlation between corruption and project performances
comparing the costs of similar megaprojects in countries with
different levels of corruption. The biggest challenge is to
isolate corruption from other factors that may lead megaproj-
ects to failure.
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between project management attributes (e.g. contract forms,
risk allocation strategies etc.) and corruption and then
investigate the causation behind the correlation.
Thirdly, it is necessary to develop tools and guidelines,
expanding the work presented in (IPMA, 2015) which is a
short, ten pages document with the Code of Ethics and
Professional Conduct (actually the relevant section is three
pages). Even if the document does not explicitly mention
corruption, it acknowledges its existence and states that:
“Whenever possible, we avoid real or perceived conflicts of
interest, and disclose them to affected parties when they do
exist. […] We reject all forms of bribery. (p. 6)” So, this code of
conduct is a starting point, even if it lacks an action plan.
Fourthly, corruption does not simply lead to extra cost and
delay, but also increases the transaction costs such the effort to
set a certain procurement and controlling system. For instance,
Zhang et al. (2015), looking at land hoarding in China, found
that when the net loss for corruption “income from corruption
minus the penalties for corruption and cost of strict inspections”
is less than the cost of strict inspections, the final evolutionary
stable strategy of the inspectors is to carry out indolent
inspections. The topic of increased project transaction costs is
vastly under-investigated.
Lastly, it is necessary to develop tools and control systems to
address the “corruption performance” of a project. Corruption in
megaprojects is most likely the main cause of their inefficiencies,
and the academic community should not deliberately ignore this
aspect in the project management literature.
There is an elephant in the room, let's talk about it!
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